Understanding the Western Libya’s Government of National Unity’s (GNU) Land Forces: Hybrid Security and Armed Group Integration in Western Libya’s Land Forces

While Tripoli remains the principal centre of political authority and security competition in western Libya, the capital’s armed landscape cannot be understood in isolation. The balance of power within Tripoli has been coexisting with armed actors based in other western Libyan cities whose military capabilities, political alliances, and economic networks extend well beyond their local areas of operation. Among these, Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan have emerged as particularly significant centres of armed mobilisation since 2011, each developing distinct security structures shaped by local histories, social dynamics, and relationships with successive national authorities.

Misrata has developed the most institutionalised security sector among Libya’s major revolutionary strongholds. Many of its prominent armed groups were gradually incorporated into state structures while preserving their internal cohesion and local identity. Key formations such as the 301st Brigade, the 166th Brigade, the special operation forces – Joint Operations Force, and the Counter Terrorism Force, have become important components of western Libya’s security architecture. As a result, Misratan networks remain among the most influential actors within the security institutions aligned with the Government of National Unity (GNU), with many commanders occupying senior positions within state structures.

In contrast, Zawiya’s security environment remains highly fragmented. Armed groups are organized around neighbourhood, family, and tribal networks, with competition over economic resources, including fuel distribution, smuggling routes, and infrastructure playing a central role in local power dynamics. Prominent actors include the Faruq Brigade network, the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU), Force III, the Nasr Brigade, and groups linked to the Abu Zariba and Khushlaf families. While these actors often cooperate with national authorities and larger western Libyan coalitions, they continue to prioritize local interests and maintain substantial autonomy from central government control.

Zintan presents a different model, having evolved from a relatively unified revolutionary coalition into a politically divided security landscape. Armed actors in the city are distributed across competing networks that align variously with western authorities, eastern authorities, or local interests. Key factions include networks associated with Osama al-Juwaili, remnants of the former Zintan Military Council, forces linked to Idris Madi, the Al-Samah Group, and Petroleum Facilities Guard-affiliated elements. These divisions have reduced Zintan’s collective influence compared with the immediate post-2011 period, although individual Zintani commanders continue to play important roles within both western and eastern security structures. Taken together, the cases of the capital Tripoli and the Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan illustrate the persistence of hybrid security governance in Libya. Although many armed groups have acquired formal state affiliations through Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Internal Affairs, local identities and informal networks remain the primary sources of cohesion and authority.

From March 2021 through June 2025, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data monitor, 64 instances of battles have been recorded, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups, stemming from 28 distinct outbreaks of violence that collectively lasted only 26 days. This pattern underscores a broader dynamic of localized, short-lived, and rapidly contained confrontation within the capital’s fragmented security environment. Rather than sustained warfare, these incidents typically reflect calibrated demonstrations of power within the blurred space between formal state authority and militia autonomy. In many cases, they are linked to attempts to signal dominance, adjust bargaining positions, or renegotiate influence within an increasingly competitive intra-elite political landscape. The immediate triggers of violence are often specific and operational rather than strategic. The most frequent catalyst is contested arrests and detentions, which escalated into armed clashes on at least nine recorded occasions during the period. A particularly illustrative case followed the Special Deterrence Force’s (RADA) capture of the 444th Brigade commander Mahmud Hamza at Mitiga Airport in August 2023, which triggered two days of fighting between the two groups before a ceasefire was brokered and Hamza was transferred to the Stability Support Apparatus and subsequently released. Similar dynamics have repeatedly emerged in confrontations involving the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) and the Judicial Police, which have clashed on multiple occasions, including with heavy weapons, following disputed arrests and enforcement actions. Prime minister Dbeibeh is certainly aware of the specific security apparatus structure under his governance and warned against further militia clashes but as he said on one of the meeting following one of the usual clashes in 2023, “If the Rival militias do not calm down and are not satisfied with a conciliatory solution there will be other decisions regarding them people’s lives are not a game there will be other measures against them we have to be harsh.”, which means that the government can tolerate the symbiosis of the different semi-formal groups provided they do not cause violence which destabilizes and embarrass the state in front of neighbors and international community. He repeated the same on May 17 2025 after the clashes between the SSA and Brigade 444, and later between Brigade 444 and the Rada Forces saying “the militias have become bigger than the State itself” and calling on militia members to join state institutions, within which will receive their rights.

Another key driver of instability is territorial encroachment into areas controlled by rival groups or perceived as neutral jurisdictions. Such movements are frequently interpreted as deliberate provocations, reflecting the continued sensitivity of informal territorial boundaries and contested security mandates across the capital. Despite these recurring flashpoints, violence in Tripoli remains highly localized and temporally constrained, with over 80 percent of incidents lasting less than a day. This indicates a structural aversion among armed actors to sustained large-scale conflict. This restraint is shaped by both strategic calculation and reputational incentives. Most armed groups in Tripoli are deeply embedded within state institutions and simultaneously operate as local security providers, creating strong incentives to present themselves as guarantors of order rather than autonomous warlords. PM Dbeibeh summarizes the security situation regarding militias stating: “Since our (GNU Government of March 2021) arrival, the militias have split into three groups: one group returned to its previous activities, another group engaged in work within state institutions, and a third group remained militias extorting the state.”

Prolonged escalation would also carry significant systemic risks, including the potential opening for external intervention, most notably by the Libyan National Army (LNA), seeking to exploit internal fragmentation. As a result, Tripoli’s security environment is characterised by a pattern of calibrated violence, conflict containment, and the frequent use of informal and quasi-institutionalised mechanisms of de-escalation, including back-channel mediation and rapid negotiated settlements. Effective security-sector reform in Libya, especially regarding the land forces will require more than the gradual integration of armed actors into formal institutions; it demands a deliberate and sustained effort to transform the fragmented security landscape into a coherent, professional, and nationally accountable force structure. This entails engaging not only with formal ministries and command hierarchies, but also with the entrenched local power networks that continue to underpin security provision and political authority across western Libya. At the same time, reform cannot remain confined to accommodation and incorporation alone. The persistence of locally rooted armed groups highlights the urgency of moving beyond hybrid arrangements toward genuine unification, standardisation of command, and the development of disciplined, centrally coordinated armed forces capable of responding to contemporary security challenges. In an international environment increasingly shaped by high-intensity, technology-driven warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those in Ukraine and the evolving security doctrines of states like Iran, fragmented and locally bounded security structures are increasingly inadequate. Western Libya’s long-term stability will therefore depend on a decisive and forward-looking modernisation agenda: one that prioritises interoperability, unified doctrine, professional training, and clear civilian oversight. Without such transformation, the security sector will remain vulnerable to cyclical fragmentation and localised competition, limiting both state consolidation and effective national defence. A coherent and modernised security architecture is not simply an institutional aspiration, but a strategic necessity for Libya’s political survival and regional relevance.