The SCO at 25: From Regional Security Mechanism to Platform for a Multipolar Eurasia

The SCO’s evolution raises a broader question: what does its transformation tell us about the changing structure of international politics? The organisation increasingly presents itself as part of a wider shift towards a multipolar international system. At their July 2026 meeting, SCO foreign ministers maintained that the influence of Global South countries and new centres of economic and political power was growing and reaffirmed their support for a more representative international order based on sovereign equality, multilateralism and respect for different civilisations. Yet the SCO’s contribution to multipolarity is better understood through the way its members use the organisation than through official statements alone.

The SCO should therefore not be characterised simply as an “anti-Western bloc”. Perhaps the most obvious example is India. In addition to maintaining a strategic partnership with the US, fortifying ties with the European Union (EU), and participating in the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, New Delhi is a full member of the SCO and participates in its security and diplomatic mechanisms. India’s involvement in these organisations shows that it is not necessary to choose between the Western and non-Western camps to engage with the SCO. Rather, India employs distinct institutional platforms for distinct strategic goals: the SCO offers a platform for interaction with China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics, while the Quad supports its Indo-Pacific goals.

The organisation’s internal dynamics reinforce this point. China and Russia cooperate closely within the SCO, particularly on regional security and their shared preference for a more multipolar international system, but their interests are not identical. India and China remain strategic competitors and face unresolved territorial disputes, yet both are active members of the SCO. India and Pakistan likewise maintain longstanding political and security tensions while participating in the same organisation. Iran has its own regional priorities, while the Central Asian states seek to maintain relationships with multiple external powers rather than becoming dependent on any single one. The continued functioning of the SCO despite these differences demonstrates that its model of cooperation does not depend on geopolitical uniformity.

The India-China relationship provides a particularly revealing example. The 2020 Galwan Valley confrontation, which resulted in deaths on both sides, produced the most serious deterioration in bilateral relations in decades. Yet India and China continued to participate in SCO meetings and summits. The organisation did not resolve their border dispute, nor was it designed to do so. Its significance lies instead in maintaining an institutional channel through which the two countries can continue to interact alongside other Eurasian powers, even when bilateral relations are strained. This illustrates that the SCO may be more effective at managing strategic differences than resolving them.

India–Pakistan relations offer a similar, if more limited, example. Despite longstanding political and security tensions, both have remained within the SCO since joining in 2017. The organisation does not resolve their bilateral disputes but provides a multilateral setting in which rivalry does not eliminate opportunities for dialogue and limited cooperation.

The position of the Central Asian states further illustrates the logic of multipolarity. Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy, for example, illustrates how a Central Asian state can engage simultaneously with China, Russia, Europe and other external partners while using regional institutions such as the SCO to preserve diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Rather than choosing a single geopolitical patron, they can use overlapping institutions to diversify economic partnerships, security relationships and diplomatic options.

This pattern reflects a flexible form of multipolarity. States increasingly participate in several institutions simultaneously, cooperate with different powers on different issues and avoid treating international politics as a choice between two fixed camps. The SCO is particularly suited to this environment because it does not force its members to adopt a common foreign policy or establish a collective-defence commitment. Its members can disagree on bilateral disputes while continuing to cooperate where their interests overlap.

The SCO is therefore less like a traditional military alliance and more like a platform for managing diversity within a multipolar system. Its importance does not necessarily lie in replacing Western-led institutions or constructing a single alternative bloc. Rather, it provides another layer of regional governance in which major, middle, and smaller powers can interact on the basis of sovereignty, flexibility, and selective cooperation.

The challenge, however, is whether this flexibility can generate meaningful outcomes. An organisation capable of accommodating differences can remain inclusive, but excessive differences can also limit its ability to act collectively. The SCO’s next phase will therefore test whether its diverse membership is ultimately an institutional strength or a constraint on deeper cooperation. Its ability to maintain dialogue, expand practical cooperation and manage strategic competition may determine whether the organisation becomes a durable pillar of a multipolar Eurasian order or remains primarily a forum for political consultation.