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The Dual Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: Repercussions for Regional Stakeholders
Tahir Azad
ANALYSIS SERIES
Analysis//0004/April/2026/London-Dialogue. 21 April 2026
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint, connecting the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. The strait witnesses the transiting of 20% of global oil shipments and 25% of LNG transportation. However, this strait has become the focal point of an unprecedented maritime crisis following Iran’s closure of the waterway from February 28, 2026, and the subsequent Naval blockade by the United States Navy as announced by U.S. President Donald J. Trump with effect from April 13, 2026. The most recent development occurred after the failure of US-Iran peace negotiations, held at Islamabad on April 11, 2026. The dual blockade has created multiple implications for global energy security, international law and regional stability. This analysis examines the strategic dynamics, economic consequences, and diplomatic ramifications of this evolving crisis.
The Genesis of the Dual Blockade
The maritime catastrophe of the 21st century commenced with the imposition of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched unprovoked airstrikes against Iranian military facilities, nuclear sites, and leadership, resulting in the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In response, the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) declared the Strait of Hormuz an actual war zone and closed it for all incoming and outgoing vessels affiliated with the U.S., Israel and their allies. The condition became aggravated when the IRGC launched 21 confirmed attacks to date on merchant ships as well as deployed naval mines throughout the strait channel.
The Iranian regime utilised this closure as a strategic weapon against the US and its allies. Although the waterway was initially closed for all traffic, subsequently, Tehran allowed selective ships to safely navigate through the chokepoint while imposing transit tolls exceeding $1 million per ship on permitted vessels. China, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia and Thailand were the states that benefited from this concession. This strategy of Iran effectively weaponised the strait while maintaining crucial economic relationships with non-Western powers.
Strategic Dynamics of Competing Blockades
The current scenario presents an unprecedented maritime security paradox. U.S. Central Command has clarified that the American blockade targets “all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports” while ostensibly permitting transit for vessels travelling to and from non-Iranian ports. However, the practical implementation creates immediate friction, as Iran maintains its own closure regime and has threatened “severe response” against military vessels approaching the strait.
This dual blockade creates several strategic complications. First, the legal basis for the U.S. action rests upon the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994), yet the simultaneous enforcement of competing blockades by belligerent states introduces unprecedented legal ambiguity. Second, the operational environment requires U.S. forces to conduct mine clearance operations while simultaneously enforcing interdiction against Iranian-linked shipping, a combination of permissive and restrictive operations that strains military resources and creates potential for inadvertent escalation.
The potential deployment of significant U.S. naval assets, including the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, 11 destroyers, the USS Tripoli amphibious group, and specialised mine countermeasures vessels, demonstrates the resource intensity of this dual mission. Meanwhile, Iranian fast-attack craft, despite significant losses during the conflict, retain capacity for asymmetric harassment operations.
Economic Repercussions and Market Response
The dual blockade has generated severe economic disruptions that exceed historical precedents. Brent crude oil prices have surged past $101 per barrel, with expected peaks reaching $126 per barrel during the crisis, representing the most rapid oil price escalation in recent history. The crisis has been characterised by analysts as the largest disruption to world energy supply since the 1970s energy crisis. The economic impact manifests through multiple channels.
Approximately 732 vessels remain trapped within the Persian Gulf, with 230 loaded oil tankers awaiting transit. Major container shipping companies, including Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag- Lloyd has suspended operations, while 15,000 cruise passengers remain stranded aboard six vessels unable to transit the strait. In addition, beyond petroleum, the crisis has disrupted supplies of liquefied natural gas, fertilizers (30% of internationally traded fertilizers transit Hormuz), aluminum, and helium, creating cascading effects on global agriculture and industrial production.
Moreover, protection and indemnity insurance war risk coverage was withdrawn effective March 5, 2026, rendering commercial operations economically unviable regardless of physical security conditions. Current insurance premiums have increased four to six times above baseline rates, with additional surcharges for straight transit. Despite the crisis, Iranian oil exports remain structurally active, with approximately 157.7 million barrels on water and 97.6% directed toward China. Beijing’s strategic relationship with Tehran has enabled continued energy flows, potentially insulating China from the worst effects while Western economies face acute shortages.
Regional Stakeholders’ Position Analysis
The Gulf Arab states face existential economic threats from the prolonged closure. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar remain dependent on hydrocarbon exports for government revenues, yet their alternative pipeline infrastructure, including the East-West Pipeline and Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, provides insufficient capacity to compensate for full strait closure.
The UAE’s position exemplifies regional complexity. While Abu Dhabi has expressed support for U.S. military operations to regain control of Hormuz, Dubai and Fujairah face severe economic damage as major bunkering and trading hubs. The Emirates’ strategic storage facilities at Ruwais provide limited buffer capacity, but the federation cannot sustain prolonged export disruptions.
Saudi Arabia faces particular vulnerability. Despite pre-conflict attempts to accelerate oil exports and reduce storage risks, the Kingdom remains dependent on Hormuz transit for the majority of its export capacity. The crisis threatens both immediate revenue losses and long-term market share as consumers accelerate diversification efforts.
Iraq’s position illustrates the interconnected vulnerabilities of regional oil producers. Despite possessing substantial reserves, Baghdad lacks sufficient alternative export infrastructure, the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline having faced persistent operational and political challenges. The March 11, 2026 Iranian drone attacks on oil tankers off Basra demonstrate the expansion of conflict zones beyond the immediate strait area.
Jordan and Lebanon face catastrophic fuel shortages, compounding existing economic crises. Lebanon’s Hezbollah-related involvement in the broader conflict further complicates humanitarian access and energy security.
Israel has leveraged its Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, Tamar and Leviathan, to achieve substantial energy security independence. However, the war’s expansion into Lebanese territory and continued Hezbollah rocket attacks create operational risks for offshore infrastructure. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s full endorsement of the U.S. blockade reflects Israel’s strategic alignment with maximum pressure against Iran.
International Powers and Great Power Competition
The Trump administration’s blockade strategy represents a high-risk escalation following diplomatic failure. The President’s public statements, threatening to “immediately ELIMINATE” any Iranian vessels approaching the blockade and claiming Iran’s navy has been “completely obliterated”, suggest a coercive strategy designed to force Iranian capitulation. However, the blockade’s economic costs for American consumers are substantial. Gasoline prices have increased 40% since the war’s commencement, with the administration facing political pressure regarding inflation impacts. Trump’s assertion that “we don’t use this strait” and “we have our own oil and gas” downplays the global economic interdependencies that ultimately affect U.S. economic interests. Congressional opposition is mounting, with Democrats vowing to force votes limiting presidential military authorities. The administration’s legal basis for the blockade under the San Remo Manual may face constitutional challenges regarding congressional war powers.
Beijing’s response to the dual blockade reflects strategic caution and economic opportunism. China has criticised Iran for regional attacks while simultaneously benefiting from preferential access to Iranian oil exports. The Chinese yuan has reportedly become the settlement currency for Iranian transit tolls, potentially accelerating de-dollarisation trends in regional energy trade. China’s official statements emphasise the importance of protecting global shipping routes while opposing unilateral American military action. This balanced position preserves Beijing’s relationships with both Gulf Arab suppliers and Iran while positioning China as a potential mediator.
Moscow’s response has focused on market stability concerns, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warning that the U.S. blockade will “continue to negatively impact international markets”. Russia’s veto of the Bahrain-sponsored UN Security Council resolution on April 7, 2026, alongside China, demonstrates alignment with Iran against Western-led enforcement mechanisms. The crisis potentially benefits Russian hydrocarbon exports as alternative suppliers, though Moscow’s official rhetoric emphasises de-escalation.
The European response has been fragmented. France has maintained Operation Aspides for merchant vessel escort, with President Macron coordinating with South Korea regarding strait reopening efforts. However, Spain’s outright rejection of the U.S. blockade as making “no sense” and Prime Minister Sanchez’s closure of airspace to U.S. military operations represent significant NATO discord.
The United Kingdom has declined participation in the U.S. blockade, with Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasising the British focus on reopening the strait “as quickly as possible” rather than enforcing additional restrictions. This positions London as a potential mediator while maintaining distance from Trump’s escalatory approach.
Legal and Diplomatic Implications
The dual blockade creates unprecedented challenges for international maritime law. Iran’s closure violates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 regarding transit passage through international straits. However, the U.S. blockade’s legal foundation under the San Remo Manual, a non-binding document applicable to armed conflicts, raises questions regarding its legitimacy under peacetime or ceasefire conditions.
The April 7, 2026, Russian and Chinese veto of the UN Security Council resolution on Hormuz security, citing bias against Iran and inappropriate timing following Trump’s threats, demonstrates the Security Council’s paralysis on the issue. This institutional failure leaves enforcement mechanisms dependent on ad hoc coalitions rather than multilateral authorisation.
Pakistan’s mediation efforts, while ultimately unsuccessful, indicate regional powers’ recognition that unilateral military solutions are insufficient. The Islamabad talks’ collapse over nuclear programme disputes suggests that technical arms control issues have become inextricably linked to maritime access questions.
Conclusion
The dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz represents a dangerous escalation in the 2026 Iran war, transforming a critical global chokepoint into a contested military zone subject to competing enforcement regimes. The economic costs, surging energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and stranded commercial vessels are already severe and will compound with duration. The crisis exposes the limitations of unilateral military solutions to complex geopolitical disputes. While the U.S. blockade may degrade Iranian economic capacity, it simultaneously risks global recession, alienates allies, and creates conditions for inadvertent military escalation. Iran’s selective-access strategy has successfully maintained crucial relationships with China and other non-Western powers while maximising pressure on American allies. For regional stakeholders, the crisis necessitates accelerated infrastructure diversification, including pipeline alternatives and strategic reserve development. For international powers, the situation demands renewed diplomatic engagement that addresses both immediate maritime access and underlying nuclear proliferation concerns. The dual blockade cannot be sustained indefinitely without catastrophic economic consequences. The international community’s challenge lies in constructing face-saving exit mechanisms that preserve security interests while restoring freedom of navigation through this strategic chokepoint.
Dr Sayed Amir Hussain Shah is Director Research at the Council for Global Affairs & Policy Alternatives (CAP). CAP is a Pakistan-based think tank dedicated to providing diverse, alternative perspectives on global and societal issues through research, analysis, and advocacy. It promotes interdisciplinary dialogue and challenges traditional narratives on economic, social, and environmental challenges The author is serving as a Visiting Assistant Professor at Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology (SZABIST), contributing to the field of International Relations through academic instruction and research. Holds a PhD from Department of International Relations, Karachi University, with a focus on Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean. He brings a strong academic foundation in political science and international affairs, complemented by skills in team building and management. Published multiple research articles in accredited national and international journals and holds certifications in leadership and human resource management. Dedicated to advancing knowledge in maritime security, geopolitics, Middle East affairs, Pakistan’s foreign policy and regional security dynamics.
Tahir Azad
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