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Strategic Competition and Regional Connectivity: China, Pakistan, Iran and the Future of Eurasian Geopolitics

Picture of Dr Tauseef Javed

Dr Tauseef Javed

Analysis Series

Analysis/0069/August/2026/London-Dialogue. 24 August 2026

Author: Dr Tauseef Javed

Overview

Eurasia is undergoing major geopolitical and economic change. Its traditional connectivity, based on trade routes and great-power influence, is now complemented by land corridors, ports, railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure. China, Pakistan, and Iran, due to their strategic locations, are pivotal in shaping the future of Eurasian connectivity.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided the broadest framework for this transformation. Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has sought to connect China with Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and other regions through infrastructure, trade, and investment networks. Within this wider framework, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents one of the most strategically significant projects because it connects China’s western region to Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast through a combination of transport, energy, industrial and digital infrastructure. Pakistan, consequently, occupies a potentially important position between China, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Iran holds a vital, though different, position between Central Asia, the Caucasus, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East, serving as a regional connector. Its ports, railways, and access to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea enable it to link Chinese and Central Asian markets with South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Scholars now see Iran as more than just a Middle Eastern power but as a Eurasian connectivity hub within China’s geo-economic strategy. The current competition concerns the architecture of Eurasian connectivity: trade routes, regional ports, control over logistical nodes, and the ways infrastructure shapes geopolitical power.

China's Expanding Eurasian Strategy

China’s strategy for Eurasia hinges on using economic links to build strategic influence. The BRI is more than infrastructure; it aims to create interconnected economic zones where China leads. Overland routes are crucial for Beijing, as they reduce reliance on maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, through which much of China’s trade and energy imports pass. Developing continental routes enhances China’s strategic resilience.

The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), extending from China’s Xinjiang through Central Asia to Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East, exemplifies this approach. China’s Eurasian strategy relies on developing overlapping networks through Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, and Russia amid rising geopolitical tensions. The Russia-Ukraine war, U.S.-China tensions, instability in the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz’s importance in recent crises highlight the need for alternative routes. China’s goal is to create strategic redundancy, with routes such as the Middle Corridor, Iranian routes, and CPEC’s Arabian Sea connection serving as backups if any one route becomes vulnerable.

CPEC and Pakistan's Geographical Advantage

Pakistan’s key strategic asset is its geography, situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, China, and the Middle East, with access to the Arabian Sea. CPEC leverages this by connecting China’s Xinjiang to Pakistan’s coast through infrastructure for energy, telecom, and industry, as well as Gwadar Port. It aims to boost regional connectivity and economic cooperation.

Gwadar is particularly important because of its location close to the Persian Gulf and major maritime trade routes. Its significance, however, should not be exaggerated. A port does not automatically become a major regional hub merely because of its geographical position. Port capacity, hinterland connectivity, security, customs procedures, industrial activity, and commercial demand are equally important.

The future of CPEC will therefore increasingly depend on Pakistan’s ability to shift from an infrastructure-centred model to a trade- and production-centred one. CPEC’s second phase, frequently described as CPEC 2.0, has placed greater emphasis on industrial cooperation, special economic zones, agriculture, information technology and broader economic integration. Pakistan’s geographical position could become more valuable if CPEC connects beyond China-Pakistan ties. A network linking Gwadar with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and possibly Iran could turn CPEC into a regional connectivity platform. However, security issues, tough terrain, poor infrastructure, political instability, regulatory flaws, and limited industrial capacity hinder this. Pakistan must turn its geographical edge into lasting economic benefit.

Iran: The Missing Link in Eurasian Connectivity?

Iran’s position presents a different connectivity model. While Pakistan provides China with access to the Arabian Sea, Iran offers multiple routes connecting East Asia with Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Europe. The China-Central Asia-West Asia corridor passes through Iran, making the country particularly important for China’s western connectivity strategy. Iran also provides access to the Persian Gulf through ports such as Bandar Abbas and to the Arabian Sea through Chabahar. Iran’s significance is boosted by the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network linking India and Iran to the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe. It offers a north-south alternative to maritime routes via the Suez Canal. Chabahar enhances this, as India’s port access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypasses Pakistan. India invested in the Shahid Beheshti terminal, making Chabahar crucial for regional connectivity, but the recent war in Iran and India’s implicit support for Israel have severely eroded Indian strategic influence over Chabahar.

Consequently, Iran occupies a fascinating position in Eurasian geopolitics. It is simultaneously a partner for China, a connectivity platform for Central Asia, a participant in the Russia-linked INSTC, and a partner of India at Chabahar. Rather than belonging exclusively to one geopolitical bloc, Iran can potentially interact with several competing connectivity systems.

Gwadar and Chabahar: Competition or Complementarity?

Gwadar and Chabahar, only 72 km apart, symbolise Sino-Indian rivalry. Gwadar is linked to China and the CPEC, while Chabahar was previously linked to India, but recent Iranian wars and India’s alleged covert support to Israel and the US have diminished its influence. Nevertheless, interpreting Gwadar and Chabahar solely as rival ports is too simplistic.

The two ports serve complementary roles: Gwadar acts as a trade gateway for China-Pakistan and potentially Central Asian and Middle Eastern markets, while Chabahar offers an alternative for Afghanistan and Central Asia and connects Iranian networks. In an integrated regional economy, cargo could be distributed across multiple ports, fostering both competition and cooperation. Pakistan, Iran, and China could benefit from improved road and rail links, while India continues to use Chabahar in its interests. This shift from geopolitical rivalry to geo-economic competition via infrastructure highlights potential regional cooperation.

Central Asia and the New Eurasian Connectivity Map

Central Asia is becoming a key focus of this shift. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all landlocked countries, rely on secure transportation routes to access global markets. China’s economic influence in the region has grown, and Central Asian countries are actively seeking to diversify their international partnerships. Consequently, multiple overlapping and competing corridors are now forming. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connects China, via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, to the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. Its importance has increased substantially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted established assumptions about Eurasian trade routes. Recent analysis indicates that cargo volumes through Kazakhstan on the Middle Corridor have increased significantly, highlighting the growing importance of alternative east-west routes.

At the same time, Iran is promoting southern connectivity through Central Asia. Routes linking Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with Iran could provide landlocked Central Asian states with access to Iranian ports and markets. Such developments could also strengthen China’s ability to connect western China with the Middle East through multiple land routes. Pakistan can position itself as a southern gateway to Central Asia via Gwadar if roads and railways connect to Central Asia through Afghanistan or other routes. However, this needs major improvements in security, infrastructure, and transit.

Strategic Competition and the Future Balance of Power

The Eurasian connectivity system features competition among corridors, not just states. The Northern Corridor via Russia, the TITR through Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, the Southern Corridor through Iran and Pakistan-Afghanistan, and maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf all vary in cost, security, and political risk.

This creates a new form of geo-economic competition where states compete for transit flows, not just territory or military influence. China’s edge is in participating in multiple connectivity systems, investing in Central Asia, maintaining CPEC with Pakistan, deepening relations with Iran, and engaging indirectly in Eurasian networks. Iran can also connect with China, Russia, India, and Central Asia. Pakistan could link China to the Arabian Sea and Central Asia but faces internal and regional obstacles. The result may be a more multipolar Eurasia with no single dominant corridor.

Conclusion

The future of Eurasian geopolitics hinges on connectivity. China, Pakistan, and Iran play vital roles due to their strategic positions linking regional networks. China contributes capital, industry, and strategic vision for connectivity initiatives. Pakistan provides access to the Arabian Sea and serves as a southern gateway. Iran functions as a multidirectional bridge connecting Central Asia, South Asia, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. Projects like CPEC, BRI, TITR, CCWAEC, and INSTC form a growing Eurasian transportation network rather than standalone projects. The main question now is which networks will facilitate the movement of goods, energy, capital, and information across Eurasia. Pakistan has a major opportunity with Gwadar’s strategic location but needs to improve security, infrastructure, customs, industrial capacity, and regional trade to become a true connectivity hub.

Iran faces sanctions and war with the US, and Israel has added uncertainty, yet its geography presents distinct opportunities, especially for Eurasian connectivity via north-south and east-west routes. China’s network offers strategic redundancy and market access, but its effectiveness hinges on sustainable infrastructure investments. Eurasian connectivity is likely to feature overlapping corridors instead of isolated zones. While rivalry remains fierce, improved connectivity could foster cooperation. A major geopolitical change may be Eurasia evolving from separate areas into an interconnected geo-economic region, with China, Pakistan, and Iran each playing unique but significant roles.

Picture of Dr Tauseef Javed

Dr Tauseef Javed

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