Religious Rhetoric Around the Mecca Defence Agreement and Its Long-Term Impacts for Pakistan

The territorial dispute predates the Houthi movement. After Ottoman authority collapsed following World War I, Yemen’s Zaydi Imamate and the expanding Saudi state contested the modern border, including Asir, Jizan and Najran. Saudi Arabia defeated Yemen in 1934, and the Treaty of Taif formalised its control over much of the disputed territory. Many Yemenis viewed the settlement as unequal and imposed after military defeat, fuelling resentment for decades. The border was not fully settled until the 2000 Treaty of Jeddah; scholarship continues to identify these territories as a major source of Yemeni resentment toward Saudi Arabia. However, the Houthi movement was not simply a territorial campaign to reclaim these lands. It emerged much later in northern Yemen, especially around Saada, the Zaydi heartland. Its roots lay in a 1990s Zaydi religious and cultural revival, partly prompted by Saudi Arabia’s growing promotion of Salafi institutions. Some Zaydis viewed these institutions, particularly in Saada, as threats to their traditions, fuelling counter-mobilisation. Religion mattered, but it requires nuance. Zaydism, a Shi’a branch, is doctrinally closer to Sunni Islam than Twelver Shi’ism. Thus, calling the Houthi–Saudi conflict a conventional “Sunni–Shi’a war” obscures key historical differences. The initial Houthi mobilisation aimed to preserve Zaydi identity and opposed Salafi expansion, political marginalisation and dissatisfaction with Yemen’s government.

The decisive military confrontation initially was not between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, but between the Houthis and the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Six rounds of fighting occurred between 2004 and 2010. Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi was killed by government forces in 2004, after which the movement became increasingly militarised. The conflict reflected overlapping religious, political, tribal, and socioeconomic grievances rather than a single cause. Saudi Arabia became directly involved because the Houthi insurgency threatened its southern frontier. Riyadh feared instability, smuggling, cross-border tribal networks, and armed groups establishing positions near Saudi territory. Saudi forces fought the Houthis in 2009–10, before the larger Saudi-led intervention in 2015. It is observed that Riyadh’s growing focus is on controlling border access and preventing instability in northern Yemen from spilling into Saudi Arabia. The 2015 intervention reshaped the conflict. After the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014 and advanced south, President Hadi fled Yemen. Saudi Arabia launched a campaign to reverse the takeover and restore the internationally recognised government, adding a stronger regional dimension marked by Saudi–Iranian rivalry.

Iran’s relationship with the Houthis shaped Saudi perceptions of the conflict, but the movement was not simply an Iranian creation. It grew from indigenous Yemeni roots predating its substantial ties with Iran, including Zaydi revivalism, local grievances, tribal networks, and conflict with the Saleh government. Research also cautions against explaining Houthi support solely through sectarian identity; geopolitical perceptions and political interests matter too. The answer depends on the historical layer. The Saudi–Yemeni rivalry has deep territorial roots, especially over Asir, Jizan, and Najran. The Houthi movement arose from northern Yemen’s Zaydi revival, partly in response to perceived Salafi encroachment. Yet the later Saudi–Houthi war involved more than territory or religion: domestic power, tribal structures, border security, and Saudi–Iranian rivalry also shaped it.

Therefore, the conflict is politically driven, with territorial and religious roots—not purely territorial or religious.