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Regionalising the Costs of War: Iran, the US Military Infrastructure, and the Persian Gulf

Picture of Zeinab Nikookar

Zeinab Nikookar

Analysis Series

Analysis/0071/August/2026/London-Dialogue. 30 August 2026

Author: Ms Zeinab Nikkokar

Overview

The 2026 Iran War has created an important security dilemma for the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC) in the region. GCC states depend extensively on the US for their security; however, they have sought to project an independent diplomatic identity vis-à-vis Iran during this conflict. The 2026 Iran War demonstrated that Gulf countries’ political identity/dependence does not confer any security insulation. Their territories have been used for U.S. command, airfields, logistics hubs, and naval forces in the confrontation against Iran. Hence, the host state may become exposed to retaliation regardless of its diplomatic and political policies.

This piece argues that strategic exposure in the Persian Gulf is produced not only by formal commitments but also by the geographical distribution of military power. Hence, it is an independent source of vulnerability in alliances. Drawing on Snyder’s theory of abandonment and entrapment, the article argues that the presence of U.S. military infrastructure is the primary source of strategic exposure for host states in the Middle East. The article also argues that this conflict has produced economic regionalisation due to the maritime interdependence of these countries and the security of the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. military infrastructure exposed GCC territories to Iranian strikes, while disruption of the Strait of Hormuz exposed all countries in the region to wider devastating economic consequences. Disruption of the Strait of Hormuz can impose costs on these countries because their economies are deeply dependent on maritime energy.

Alliance Entrapment Beyond Political Commitments

Snyder’s alliance security dilemma (2007) argues that allies become exposed to conflicts because of political commitments that generate fear of abandonment and entrapment. However, the geographical distribution of military infrastructure affected the regional and economic costs of this war for host countries, rather than merely their political commitments. This problem has been rooted in reliance on American military bases to secure the Gulf countries. The U.S. made bilateral military agreements with the Gulf states, which demonstrates American forward operational power projection in the Middle East.

The 2026 Iran War demonstrates this issue. Following U.S. strikes against Iran from the territory of the GCC countries, Tehran repeatedly warned its neighbors that it would retaliate against all U.S. assets and economic interests. During the 2026 War, Iran launched missile and drone attacks against U.S. bases and facilities across Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and other Gulf locations associated with the American military. Iran justified these attacks as operations against the U.S. rather than the GCC itself, since in this context, GCC states are treated as host states whose sovereignty and territory were being used by the U.S. in its offensive campaign against Iran. In the Persian Gulf, several GCC countries tried to de-escalate the confrontation through diplomatic engagements. As their territory formed part of the U.S. war infrastructure against Iran, their political efforts to remain outside the conflict did not prevent their territories from becoming exposed to Iranian retaliation.

Economic Interdependence and Regionalised Costs

Another vulnerability in the region’s security is its economic interdependence, stemming from the GCC economies’ reliance on maritime energy exports and international shipping networks. Iranian strikes against GCC countries were not only intended to damage U.S. military assets but also to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of U.S. protection for GCC territories. Through these strikes, Tehran sought to signal the costs associated with hosting U.S. military forces in the region.

This vulnerability is important because energy infrastructure, maritime routes, and military facilities are concentrated in the Persian Gulf, creating a shared vulnerability for all states in the region. Hence, the Persian Gulf is not simply a collection of states with independent security interests and environments, but rather a shared, interdependent security complex.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is one of the structural vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf that affects the interconnected economies of this region. This is because one of the vulnerabilities of energy markets is not only resource availability, but also the security of the transportation networks through which resources reach global markets. The importance of Hormuz is highlighted in this context because it is one of the main international waterways connecting the Persian Gulf to international maritime routes and carrying one-fifth of global oil and gas exports.

Even after the ceasefire in April 2026, Tehran repeatedly announced restrictions on the Strait, which led to exchanges of direct attacks between the U.S. and Iran on their military infrastructure in July 2026. This continuous shipping disruption has caused uncertainty in the global energy markets and made them volatile. Rather than competing directly with technologically superior forces, Iranian security strategy has historically emphasised asymmetric capabilities designed to threaten its adversaries’ vulnerabilities. The Strait represents a source of asymmetric leverage on the battlefield; for this, it need not have complete control over maritime traffic, only the ability to create uncertainty, raise shipping costs, affect insurance markets, and increase energy prices. GCC states’ dependence on hydrocarbon revenues and maritime commerce means that regional instability can impose economic costs even when governments attempt to remain neutral in a conflict.

The main strategic implication of this war is therefore not that Iran displaces the U.S. as the dominant security actor in the Persian Gulf nor that GCC states abandoned their American security partnerships. Rather, the conflict demonstrated that Iran has the ability to regionalise the costs of any future confrontation by targeting the military and economic infrastructure in the region. Having achieved precision-strike capabilities through its self-reliance strategy, Iran challenged the conception of deterrence by extending the costs of military escalation beyond the battlefield.

Conclusion

The 2026 Iran War demonstrated a central paradox of alliance politics in the Persian Gulf. Geography is an important dimension of host states’ exposure to U.S. power projection. Overseas military infrastructure can simultaneously enhance GCC security and increase host-state exposure when the U.S. enters conflicts with countries like Iran. The economic dimension of this conflict demonstrated that the consequences of wars are not bound to the main battlefields. Due to the economic interdependencies among GCC governments, disruptions at strategic chokepoints can impose costs on the region and beyond. Hence, the strategic and economic vulnerabilities of U.S. allies remain embedded in the region’s geography. As a result, Iran demonstrated the ability to impose regional costs without achieving conventional military superiority.

The war did not demonstrate that the GCC states now assume Iran is the main security actor in the region, nor does the evidence justify that this war has changed Iranian military strategy. Rather, the conflict demonstrated Iran’s strategy of asymmetric deterrence by raising the costs of any future intervention. The broader implication of this paper is that military geography should be at the centre of alliance politics in the Persian Gulf.

Picture of Zeinab Nikookar

Zeinab Nikookar

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