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No Longer Bystanders: Dual-Use Satellites and the Coming Targeting Problem in South Asia
Muhammad Waqas Haider
Essay Series
Essay /014/October/2026/London-Dialogue. 22 October 2026
Author: Muhammad Waqas Haider
No Longer Bystanders: Dual-Use Satellites and the Coming Targeting Problem in South Asia
A few days ago, trackers monitoring orbital traffic above us watched a Russian spacecraft, Cosmos 2612, ease onto a path that would bring it into close proximity with an American commercial radar satellite supporting Ukraine. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies laid out the manoeuvre and the uncomfortable question it poses, because Moscow has said more than once that commercial satellites aiding its enemy may be treated as legitimate targets. That warning is no longer rhetorical. Russian military writers now explicitly designate Western commercial networks such as Starlink, Maxar and Planet as objects fit for destruction, and in 2025 Russia formally told the International Telecommunication Union that European satellites helping Ukraine had forfeited their protection. The age in which a civilian-owned satellite was a bystander to war is ending, and South Asia, where two nuclear-armed rivals have just fought partly through borrowed and commercial eyes, has every reason to study the precedent now rather than after the fact.
The reason this is difficult, rather than merely alarming, is that two bodies of law pull in opposite directions, and neither was written for the orbital economy that now exists. Space law, built around the Outer Space Treaty, treats a satellite as the responsibility of the state that registered it. The law of armed conflict asks a different question: not who owns an object, but what it is used for. Under the established targeting test, a satellite loses its civilian protection when it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction offers a definite military advantage. As a careful analysis from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam puts it, space law points to one state while the law of armed conflict points to another, and the dual-use satellite sits in the gap between them. A Stanford legal reading of the same problem reached a blunter conclusion: that Starlink spacecraft enabling Ukrainian operations could lawfully be attacked regardless of their dual nature or their private ownership. The majesty of the treaty language, to borrow one analyst’s phrase, does not close a targeting loop.
Dual use, then, describes a fact rather than a shield, and it describes almost everything in orbit now. The distinction that once separated a spy satellite from a mapping satellite has dissolved, because the same high-resolution image sold for crop insurance can cue a missile, and the same broadband link that connects a village can connect a brigade. South Asia has quietly entered this condition. Over sixteen months from the start of 2025, Pakistan placed a succession of indigenous Earth-observation satellites into orbit, culminating in PRSC-EO3, built with Chinese cooperation and described in open reporting as providing near real-time imagery intelligence. Indian commentary read the build-up exactly as the targeting logic above would predict, with one widely circulated piece arguing that New Delhi must prepare an anti-satellite response to observation satellites it judged optimised for monitoring Kashmir. The framing is instructive precisely because it is not hypothetical. India already demonstrated a kinetic capability with its 2019 Mission Shakti test, and its analysts now treat laser dazzling and rendezvous operations against an adversary’s orbital sensors as options rather than taboos.
The May 2025 conflict showed that both states already fight this way, even if no satellite was touched. Pakistani targeting reportedly drew on Chinese space-based intelligence, and Indian accounts describe using a nascent space situational awareness effort to anticipate hostile satellite passes and move air defences before they were seen. In other words, each side treated the other’s space support as an operational problem to defeat, the practical antechamber to treating it as a target to destroy. The step from degrading the data to destroying the platform is shorter than the legal ambiguity makes it look, and neither capital has yet had to take it in anger.
What makes the orbital version of this problem worse than its terrestrial equivalent is that the consequences do not stay with the belligerents. A commercial satellite is shared infrastructure. The same spacecraft a military uses for reconnaissance may carry weather data, maritime traffic, disaster imagery, and connectivity for a dozen uninvolved countries, so an attack ostensibly aimed at one state’s war effort can degrade services civilians far from the fight rely on. A kinetic strike compounds the harm by scattering debris across orbits that everyone shares, including the attacker. The International Committee of the Red Cross and a growing body of legal scholarship have flagged the targeting of dual-use commercial space infrastructure as one of the most consequential unresolved questions in the law of armed conflict, undefined at precisely the moment it has become operationally significant. For South Asia, the warning is specific. A future crisis in which one side blinds or destroys the other’s imaging satellite would not be a contained tactical act; it would set a regional precedent for attacking space infrastructure, invite a response in kind against a thinner and less redundant set of assets, and do so under a nuclear overhang that rewards neither restraint tested in public nor escalation misread in private.
None of this argues for Pakistan to step back from the commercial and dual-use path, which would mean surrendering an advantage it has only recently built and can expand through partnership rather than vast expenditure. It argues instead for thinking the problem through before it arrives. Three implications follow. The first is resilience: a space posture that leans on a small number of exquisite satellites is brittle, and the answer is diversification across orbits, providers, and allies, along with commercial and proliferated capacity that is far harder to neutralise than a single prized platform. The second is situational awareness, because a state that cannot see what is manoeuvring near its own satellites cannot know when peaceful ambiguity has become a prelude to attack, and that gap is a genuine vulnerability rather than a luxury. The third is doctrine and law. Pakistan, like every space-dependent middle power, has an interest in pressing internationally for clearer rules on when a commercial satellite may be attacked and who bears responsibility when it is, because ambiguity favours the actor most willing to exploit it, and that is rarely the smaller power. The satellites overhead are no longer neutral. The question for South Asia is whether its strategists accept that fact while there is still time to shape what follows or wait until an orbit above the subcontinent writes the lesson for them.
Muhammad Waqas Haider
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