From the Middle East to Europe: How the U.S.-Israel–Iran War Is Reshaping Global Conflict Dynamics

For the war between America, Israel and Iran, it was expected that it would evolve beyond the scope of a purely regional conflict. The very initiation of the war by the United States places it outside the context of regional boundaries. The conflict already involves more than a dozen countries, ranging from all the Persian Gulf states to countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and others providing logistical, material, and technical support to the United States and Israel. However, the war has become even more globalised in the sense that it is also affecting the war in Europe between Ukraine and Russia, as well as the conflict(s) on the African continent.

American media reported that, aside from delivering some humanitarian aid, Russia has allegedly been providing Iran with information regarding the locations of American soldiers. At the same time, it was claimed that Russia is not participating in the coordination of attacks. Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth stated that such information does not concern him, while U.S. President Donald Trump, when asked by the BBC and Reuters about the possibility of Russian intelligence being shared with Iran, replied that he “thinks he (Vladimir Putin) is maybe helping them a little bit, yes.” “He probably thinks we are helping Ukraine,” Trump added. “They do it, and we do it too.” Therefore, although the somewhat sensationalist claims of Western media should be treated with caution, considering the long-standing partnership between Iran and Russia, as well as the nature of intelligence warfare, it is possible that where there is smoke, there is fire. Trump’s response is also interesting because, if what he said is true, he effectively acknowledged the nature of an invisible war and a tacit tolerance toward the actions of their supposed adversaries, the Russians, since America is likewise helping Russia’s enemies, that is Ukraine. It is therefore logical that the Russians would become involved to some extent in order to make things more difficult for the Americans, although Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov publicly denied Russian involvement in this war, especially against the United States. A little indirect pressure from us on you and a little from you on us, but within certain tolerable limits so that some lines are not crossed.

Ukraine enters the scene in a dual capacity: through the impact of the Iranian war on its own battlefield and through its own participation in the conflict. Firstly, the war in Iran has inevitably redirected the attention of the European Union and the United States toward the Middle East, because conflict in that region affects Western countries much more directly. Under such circumstances, there are fears that support for Kyiv could, though it has not yet, fall into the background. The continuation of U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran could consequently become an obstacle to weapons deliveries to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. American allies such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are relentlessly expending expensive high-tech missiles against waves of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, which is precisely the purpose for which they were designed but also against large numbers of cheap Shahed drones, whose potential use the Gulf states had evidently underestimated despite having them right in front of them. These missiles are extremely expensive, produced slowly, and, under the conditions of two major conflicts, consumed almost instantly. Ukraine is already facing shortages of certain types of ammunition. On the other hand, there are mentions of Ukraine’s (in)direct participation on the side of the Gulf coalition countries in the role of advisers and providers of air defence expertise, primarily against drones and ballistic missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had already, during August of last year, offered the Americans consultation and experience gained in warfare against Russian drones, only to be flatly rejected. Today, he is offering partnerships to the Gulf states and technology exchange in return for political concessions or increased pressure on Russia in Ukraine’s favour. In that context, two months ago he stated that more than two hundred Ukrainian counter-drone specialists were already present in the Middle East. According to his words, these are military experts capable of providing assistance and training in drone defence. Teams have already been deployed to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, while some are on their way to Kuwait, with cooperation agreements with several other countries already in force. Zelensky emphasised that the deployment of these specialists was carried out at the request of partner countries, including the United States.

Since missiles and drones are increasingly targeting the oil infrastructure of states such as Saudi Arabia, reports have emerged from certain Western media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, claiming that the Saudi oil giant Aramco has been engaging in talks with Ukrainian companies SkyFall and Wild Hornets regarding the purchase of drone defence systems to protect oil fields from Iranian drone attacks. However, Aramco denied these claims to Reuters, stating that “Aramco is aware of recent media reports alleging that the company is holding discussions with Ukrainian firms regarding the procurement of interceptor drones. These claims are inaccurate.” War does not suit Saudi Arabia because numerous divisions and rivalries exist between it and Iran, primarily the religious divide between Sunnis and Shia, as well as competition for regional influence. Up to the outbreak of the war, Iran did not represent such a significant threat to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, and especially its oil infrastructure, has now been exposed through this war to attacks and losses, just like Qatar’s oil and gas infrastructure, whose reconstruction under current conditions would already require three to four years. According to local sources, Saudi Arabia has been relatively successful in combating drones and missiles. Across the Gulf, around twenty people have reportedly been killed so far, most of them civilians and workers – in other words, non-combat personnel. Every human loss is tragic, but within the context and scale of the overall conflict, these losses are, speaking bluntly, relatively limited. The main problem for the Gulf states, however, comes from attacks targeting their economies and industries.

The European Union has also become involved in the anti-drone effort. As reported by Deutsche Welle, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, stated that the technologies Russia uses in the war against Ukraine are now being employed in other conflicts as well. She emphasised that the same drones that attack Kyiv on a daily basis are now appearing in the Middle East. According to her, the Gulf states should make use of Ukraine’s experience in counter-drone warfare, since Ukraine has developed drone interceptors and protection systems while also managing to produce a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles. She added that Ukraine could share this expertise with countries in the region and thereby stimulate the development of their domestic production capabilities. Kallas also stressed that Ukraine, despite being at war, has significantly increased its own production in this sector and that cooperation with the Gulf countries is already under consideration. According to her statements, representatives of those countries were surprised by the level of assistance Ukraine has been able to provide, considering that it remains under constant heavy attack itself. She also proposed that the Gulf states establish direct contacts with Ukraine and President Zelensky in order to discuss potential forms of cooperation.

The second or third element of the internationalisation of this war can be seen in the Iranian strikes on Cyprus and Turkey amid rising tensions across the region. One of Britain’s main military bases is located on Cypriot territory, and Britain is an American ally in this war, while Turkey has attempted to remain in a state of strategic neutrality regarding the conflict, despite its open rivalry with Iran.

At the beginning of March, drones allegedly of the Iranian Shahed type reportedly attacked Cyprus, including a limited strike on the British RAF airbase at Akrotiri, while additional drones were intercepted by British and Greek forces. In response, France deployed air defence systems, frigates, and the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, while other EU countries, including the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, reinforced their defensive posture in the region. Between March 4 and March 9, several ballistic missiles launched from Iranian territory entered Turkish airspace, most likely targeting the strategically important NATO base at Incirlik, which primarily hosts American military personnel, among others. NATO air defence systems, including Patriot batteries, successfully intercepted the missiles, preventing damage on the ground. Turkey requested clarification from Iran while maintaining a defensive posture, whereas NATO reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of its member state. Both incidents reflect the broader escalation of the conflict with Iran and its consequences for the Eastern Mediterranean region, prompting coordinated defensive measures by Europe and NATO.

The wider impact of this conflict can also be observed in Africa, particularly in the Sudanese Civil War. The conflict in the Middle East, triggered by U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, could alter the current balance of power in Sudan. Should the regional conflict continue to affect the RSF’s principal backer, the United Arab Emirates, the group may face a decline in external support and a corresponding weakening of its position. A hypothetical defeat of the RSF would represent a major victory for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while constituting a serious setback for Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates, potentially reshaping the balance of power across the Horn of Africa. At the same time, although the SAF could experience reduced support from Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would likely continue receiving assistance from Egypt and Turkey, neither of which is directly involved in the confrontation with Iran.

Finally, it remains to be seen how this war will affect both the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Dubai is witnessing scenes that until recently would have been considered unimaginable, with parts of the city center and skyscraper districts coming under aerial bombardment, while much of the business and “influencer” world is fleeing as the city has objectively become insecure and unstable for conducting business. The longer the war lasts, the more the survival, or decline and collapse, of Dubai as a global hub for business and tourism will come into question. Instead of Dubai, Saudi Arabia could partially assume the role of regional economic leader. With the second most powerful military in the Arab world after Egypt, Saudi Arabia is already taking initiatives such as providing secure operational space for airlines on its territory, allowing flights toward conflict zones to continue from protected rear bases. Furthermore, within this fragile environment, Saudi Arabia currently represents the only strong and stable state capable of offering a certain degree of security guarantees, both now and in the foreseeable future. It was always possible that the Middle Eastern powder keg would eventually ignite, just as it was evident that elite Dubai existed within an extremely “explosive” neighbourhood surrounded by hostile rivals. A fact now fully visible. In the eyes of Iran, Dubai is also paying the price of its alliance with Tehran’s enemies. One thing is certain: for a considerable period of time Dubai will no longer be perceived as a secure haven for businessmen, old and new oil elites, cryptocurrency traders, real estate investors, financial actors, or even tourists. The perception of Dubai’s personal and business security has deteriorated significantly, and the possibility of recovery will depend on how quickly the war ends, how rapidly Dubai can rebuild, and whether it can restore the trust and guarantees it once offered – or whether it will sink back into the desert abyss from which it once emerged.

Viktor Trumbetas is an Assistant Researcher at London Dialogue