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Analysis/0059/August/2026/London-Dialogue. 04 August 2026
By Dr. Ju Hyung Kim
Abstract:
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 offers a valuable lesson for managing interconnected security contingencies in today’s Northeast Asia. This article warns that a Taiwan contingency could create an opportunity for North Korea or Russia to exploit diverted United States attention and assets and therefore calls for stronger trilateral planning, larger regional stockpiling, resilient bases and logistics networks, and coordinated preparation for limited nuclear escalation.
Introduction
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 did not occur at the heart of Europe, but it profoundly affected the global balance of power: it accelerated the debacle of détente, reinforced the perception of Soviet expansionism, and contributed to the beginning of what is often called the Second Cold War. To be sure, the invasion itself did not alter the military balance on the European continent. NATO was already concerned about the deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles and the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s dual-track decision which combined planned US missile deployment with a proposal for arms-control negotiations was adopted before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, Afghanistan transformed the way Soviet behaviour was interpreted. Moscow’s military presence in Africa and Asia, its nuclear buildup in Europe, and the expansion of its influence towards the Persian Gulf started to be seen as part of a broad strategic challenge. The Western response offers invaluable lessons to the present-day United States (US), Japan, and South Korea. Unlike the Soviet Union and its satellite states during the Cold War, contemporary China, Russia, and North Korea have not forged a collective defence alliance equivalent to the Warsaw Pact. However, their strategic interests are increasingly converging.
The crucial risk is not necessarily a coordinated three-theatre war. Instead, an action by a single country could create an opportunity for another. China’s military operation against Taiwan could distract US assets and attention, encouraging North Korea to increase military coercion against South Korea or Russia to expand its activities in and around Japan.
The End of Compartmentalised Security
Prior to 1979, Western governments often addressed security problems in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia through separate regional frameworks. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced the perception that developments across these regions formed part of an interconnected global strategic challenge.
Washington therefore took measures that went beyond Afghanistan. For example, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions, restricted grain exports and technology transfers, and increased assistance to Pakistan. Furthermore, he declared that any Soviet attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be resisted by American military force. Likewise, under the Ronald Reagan administration, the US significantly increased defence expenditure, strengthened naval power, supported states that resisted Soviet influence, and reinforced alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continued arms-control negotiations and implemented the deployment of medium-range missiles. Such a combination of deterrence and diplomacy ultimately contributed to the signing of the 1987 INF Treaty.
In the case of a Taiwan contingency, key US assets—such as submarines, aircraft, air-defence systems, and ammunition—could be at least partially withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang could embark on missile launches, limited provocations, or nuclear coercion, calculating that Washington would be hesitant to manage two major crises simultaneously. Hence, the US, Japan, and South Korea should prepare for interconnected contingencies instead of treating Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the North Pacific as separate strategic problems.
The United States: Preventing a Strategic Vacuum
One concern during the initial stages of the Second Cold War was that deploying US forces to the Indian Ocean would create a military vacuum in Northeast Asia. South Korean leaders warned Washington that North Korea or the Soviet Union would miscalculate if American naval and air assets appeared to be leaving the region.
In response, the Reagan administration reconfirmed the solidity of the ROK-US alliance, ruled out any renewal of Carter’s troop-withdrawal plan, and treated Japanese and South Korean security as part of a larger regional balance. A similar principle should guide contemporary US policy. Reinforcement in a single theatre should not generate an apparent opening in another.
In that sense, the US should place larger stockpiles of missile interceptors, Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), fuel, spare parts, and runway-repair equipment in Japan and South Korea. These materials would reduce dependence on vulnerable reinforcement routes that transit the Pacific. The current stockpiles maintained by UNC-Rear in Japan are presumably substantial, but simultaneous contingencies involving Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula would place enormous strain on the US and its regional allies. Washington should also identify the minimum set of intelligence, air-defence, command-and-control, and strike assets that could remain available for Korean Peninsula deterrence during a Taiwan contingency.
If China, Russia, or North Korea attempts opportunistic escalation, strategic reserves in Northeast Asia could provide rapidly deployable air defence, electronic warfare, military logistics, and long-range fires. The key objective does not hinge on replicating every US capability. Rather, it is to illustrate the US ability to respond successfully to a crisis while not abandoning deterrence in another region.
Japan: Protecting Regional Operating Bases
Japan’s response to the Soviet invasion included diplomatic measures as well as close coordination with the US. Japan strengthened the defence of the archipelago and surrounding sea lanes, complicating Soviet naval operations and allowing US assets to focus elsewhere. Measures taken prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—most notably the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation—supported such a Japanese effort.
Today, Japan plays an even more important supporting role. In Northeast Asia, American operations are heavily dependent on Japan’s bases, ports, fuel depots, and communication networks. Japan performed a similar role during the Korean War (1950-53), substantially strengthening US warfighting capabilities.
Therefore, Tokyo should prioritise base resilience. Hardened evacuation facilities, dispersed ammunition-storage facilities, mobile command posts, and decoy systems could reduce the effectiveness of Chinese or North Korean missile attacks. Japan should also strengthen its Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), maritime surveillance, and Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) capabilities near the southwestern islands, the Tsushima Strait, and the approaches to the Sea of Japan.
Japan’s logistics-support system should be capable of refuelling, repairing, and supplying American—and, if politically or legally possible, South Korean forces. It should safeguard civilian ports, electric grids, communication systems, and transport infrastructure whose disruption could paralyse allied operations. While the outbreak of a Taiwan contingency would make the full implementation of OPLAN 5055—a US-Japan operational plan for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, difficult, the signing of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) would facilitate Japan’s logistical support for South Korea.
South Korea: Denying North Korea an Opportunity
During the Cold War period, South Korea’s primary role was to deter North Korea from exploiting US involvement in other regions. Seoul maintained large-scale forces, enlarged its military capacity, and underscored that stability on the Korean Peninsula would buttress broader regional stability. Today’s South Korea could offer a far greater contribution. South Korea currently possesses advanced conventional arms, precision-guided missiles, modern shipbuilding, sophisticated electronic technology, and substantial defence-industrial capacity. Nonetheless, South Korea’s most crucial contribution during a Taiwan contingency would be to prevent North Korea from opening a second front.
This does not require a commitment to automatically send South Korean troops to the Taiwan Strait. Facilitating the redeployment of some US Forces Korea (USFK) to Taiwan and dispatching a limited number of destroyers to protect SLOCs could be undertaken without seriously impairing deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. However, a South Korean troop deployment could weaken the defence of the Korean Peninsula and face substantial political obstacles. Instead, Seoul should be able to withstand the initial stages of the conflict while expectations of US reinforcement are notably reduced.
In that sense, South Korea also requires deeper wartime stockpiles and stronger logistical resilience. In addition, it must strengthen C-UAS, short-range air defence, protected command-and-control networks, and rapid repair capabilities for airfields and ports. Seoul should also prepare for North Korean attacks on rear-area infrastructure, including ammunition depots, mobilisation centres, logistics-support hubs, and civilian communication networks.
Meanwhile, the South Korean defence industry should be part of a wider trilateral mobilisation system. The three democracies should identify ammunition, missiles, vehicles, and naval vessels that could be either produced or repaired in South Korea during a protracted regional crisis. Licensing, export-control, emergency-procurement, and technology-sharing procedures should be negotiated before conflicts begin.
Preventing Nuclear Decoupling
North Korea’s nuclear weapons are making the current challenge riskier than that of 1979. Pyongyang might persuade Seoul that American intervention would expose South Korean cities to nuclear attacks. Simultaneously, it could discourage Washington from fulfilling its alliance commitments by threatening Japan, Guam, and the continental US. Such a nuclear-decoupling strategy would be particularly dangerous during a Taiwan contingency. While the US is already confronting nuclear-armed China, North Korea might calculate that military escalation could be avoided on the Korean Peninsula. This is not a far-fetched concern, since recent wargames suggest that the US would not opt for nuclear retaliation against a low-yield North Korean nuclear attack on South Korean military targets.
The US, Japan, and South Korea should make clear that the limited use of nuclear weapons would not terminate their collective operations. The trilateral plan should examine scenarios involving a North Korean demonstrative nuclear explosion, a nuclear attack against military facilities, a strike on reinforcement ports, and nuclear coercion conducted during a concurrent Taiwan contingency. The three countries should conduct exercises covering continuity-of-government procedures, operations from contaminated bases, medical response, public communication, and the restoration of damaged command networks.
Japan and South Korea should also participate in nuclear consultations closely coordinated with the US. Although Washington maintains separate extended-deterrence systems with its two allies in Northeast Asia, the operational consequences of North Korean nuclear use would inevitably be trilateral.
The objective is not to normalise nuclear showdowns of the kind discussed in Henry Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Rather, it is to convince the North Koreans that limited nuclear use would neither paralyse the alliance nor separate the US from its regional partners.
A Modern Dual-Track Strategy
NATO’s dual-track approach combined military preparedness with a negotiation proposal. Northeast Asia should pursue a similar approach. The deterrence track should include integrated missile alerts, resilient bases, more ammunition storage, multidomain exercises, industrial cooperation, and coordinated contingency planning. Meanwhile, existing trilateral exercises should test simultaneous crises: one of these scenarios may include China’s blockade of Taiwan, North Korean force mobilisation, and increased Russian naval and air-force activity in and around Japan. The exercises should determine how the three countries should allocate submarines, AWACS, missile-defence assets, tankers, and overall attention when multiple threats appear at the same time.
The diplomatic track should also remain open. Discussions with North Korea can focus on reducing nuclear risks, establishing military hotlines, and exercising restraint in force deployments that could increase overall instability. Regarding China, discussions should focus on crisis communication and measures to reduce accidental escalation around Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. The limited military deconfliction with Russia should also remain possible. The three democracies should avoid lumping China, Russia, and North Korea together as a monolithic bloc. Despite their overlapping interests, they remain different. Hence, deterrence should be coordinated, while diplomacy should be tailored separately to each country.
Conclusion: Denying Authoritarian Countries a Strategic Opening
The post-1979 Western response ultimately succeeded because the Soviet Union was unable to effectively exploit military dispersion or political fragmentation. NATO enlarged its defence capabilities, shared responsibilities, and sustained industrial competition while combining military pressure with negotiations.
The US, Japan, and South Korea should follow the same principle. The US should preserve sufficient forces in preparation for simultaneous contingencies. Japan should safeguard bases, SLOCs, and logistics networks supporting regional operations. South Korea should convince North Korea that a Taiwan contingency would not create room for Pyongyang’s opportunism. The crucial aim is not to replicate the strategies implemented during the Second Cold War. Rather, it is to deny China, Russia, and North Korea the confidence that regional stability could be upended by exploiting a temporary gap in alliance coordination or American attention.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that a conflict in one region could alter the strategic balance in other regions. The democracies in Northeast Asia should apply these lessons before a crisis exposes the consequences of fragmented planning.
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as President of the Security Management Institute, a defence think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly.
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