Publications
Coalition Strain and Strategic Competition: The Future of the Artemis Accords in a Contested Space Order
Muhammad Waqas Haider
Analysis Series
Analysis//0009/April/2026/London-Dialogue. 25 April 2026
Introduction
The Artemis Accords were never simply a technical framework for lunar exploration. From their inception, they have functioned as an instrument of strategic ordering in outer space, an attempt by the United States to shape the legal, political, and operational norms that will govern the next phase of human activity beyond Earth. By bringing together over thirty signatories under a shared set of principles, transparency, interoperability, peaceful use, and the responsible extraction of resources, the Accords seek to embed a US-aligned vision of space governance at a formative moment in the domain’s evolution.
Yet, as the geopolitical environment hardens, the internal cohesion of the Artemis coalition is coming under increasing strain. The Accords rest on a delicate balance between leadership and inclusivity, technological asymmetry and shared benefit, national sovereignty and collective norms. These tensions are not merely administrative or bureaucratic; they are structural, reflecting divergent national interests, industrial ambitions, and strategic cultures among participating states. As these pressures accumulate, the risk is not an abrupt collapse of Artemis but a gradual erosion of its coherence and legitimacy.
This matters because the Artemis framework exists within a broader context of intensifying strategic competition in space. China, in particular, has advanced an alternative model through the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), positioning itself as a credible counterweight to US-led initiatives. Russia’s alignment with Beijing further strengthens this alternative architecture. John Hickman, a professor of international affairs at Berry College in Mount Berry, Georgia, stated that Washington, D.C.’s Artemis Accords should not be viewed as isolated international politics, especially in relation to Beijing’s ILRS venture. In this emerging environment, the future of space governance may be determined less by formal agreements than by the ability of major powers to sustain coalitions and shape incentives. If Artemis fragments, the strategic space it leaves behind will not remain empty.
Artemis as Strategic Architecture
The Artemis Accords must be understood as part of a wider effort by the United States to maintain leadership in the space domain. NASA’s official articulation of the Accords emphasises principles such as interoperability, emergency assistance, and the registration of space objects, but these norms also serve to anchor a broader governance framework aligned with U.S. legal interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty.
This dual character, technical on the surface and strategic in substance, is not unusual. As Joan Johnson-Freese has argued, civil space cooperation has increasingly become entangled with national security considerations, particularly as space assets underpin critical military and economic functions. The same dynamic is evident in recent policy analyses by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which highlight how space initiatives are now central to, rather than peripheral to, geopolitical competition. Artemis, therefore, is not simply about returning astronauts to the Moon. It is about shaping who defines acceptable behaviour in space, how resources are allocated, and which institutional arrangements will govern future activities. In this sense, it is both a cooperative framework and a strategic instrument.
Structural Tensions within the Coalition
Despite its expanding membership, the Artemis coalition is not immune to internal friction. These tensions are not yet destabilising, but they are significant enough to shape the trajectory of the Accords over time. One of the most persistent issues is the asymmetry in technological capabilities and industrial participation. The United States dominates key areas of space technology, from launch systems to deep-space infrastructure, and this dominance is reflected in the distribution of roles within Artemis projects. While partners such as the European Space Agency, Japan, and Canada contribute critical components, their ability to access high-end technologies remains constrained by export control regimes, particularly the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This creates a structural imbalance. As RAND analysis on global space partnerships notes, sustained asymmetry can generate dissatisfaction if partners perceive themselves as dependent rather than genuinely collaborative participants. Over time, this can erode political support for joint initiatives, especially in countries where domestic space industries are seeking greater autonomy.
A second area of tension lies in the question of resource utilisation. The Artemis Accords endorse the extraction and use of space resources, aligning with U.S. domestic legislation such as the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. However, this interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty is not universally accepted. Legal scholars have pointed to the ambiguity surrounding property rights in space, noting that while resource use is not explicitly prohibited, its legal status remains contested. For some Artemis partners, particularly those with strong commitments to multilateral governance, this raises concerns about the potential unilateralisation of space resources. The absence of a widely accepted international regime creates uncertainty and opens the door to competing interpretations.
A deeper and more subtle tension concerns the balance between strategic alignment and national autonomy. European states, in particular, have increasingly emphasised the importance of “strategic autonomy” in space, seeking to reduce dependence on external actors while maintaining cooperative ties. This is not a rejection of Artemis, but it does signal a more cautious approach to alignment. Similarly, countries such as India and the United Arab Emirates are pursuing parallel national programmes alongside their participation in U.S.-led initiatives. These dynamics suggest that Artemis is less a unified bloc than a network of overlapping interests. Partners are participating, but they are also hedging.
China’s Alternative: The International Lunar Research Station
While Artemis navigates these internal complexities, China has been advancing a parallel vision for the future of space cooperation. The International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), developed in partnership with Russia, represents a deliberate attempt to create an alternative institutional and operational framework. According to official statements from the China National Space Administration (CNSA), the ILRS is envisioned as a long-term, multi-phase project involving robotic and human exploration, infrastructure development, and international collaboration. Unlike Artemis, which is anchored in a set of normative principles, the ILRS is framed more as a pragmatic platform for joint development.
This distinction is significant. China’s approach places less emphasis on formalised norms and more on practical cooperation, potentially making it more attractive to states that are wary of regulatory constraints or political alignment. As CSIS analysis has noted, China’s space strategy combines technological development with diplomatic outreach, using infrastructure projects as a means of building long-term partnerships. The appeal of this model should not be underestimated. For countries that feel marginalised within the Artemis framework, or that seek greater flexibility in their partnerships, the ILRS offers an alternative pathway.
Russia’s Strategic Alignment
Russia’s role in this evolving landscape is both consequential and complex. Following the deterioration of its relations with Western states, Moscow has increasingly aligned itself with China in the space domain. Roscosmos has formally committed to the ILRS project, framing it as a more equitable alternative to US-led initiatives. This alignment is not merely symbolic. Russia retains significant capabilities in areas such as launch systems and human spaceflight, and its participation enhances the credibility of the ILRS. At the same time, its exclusion from Western-led frameworks reinforces the perception that space governance is becoming increasingly polarised. From a strategic perspective, Russia acts as both a disruptor and an enabler. It undermines the universality of Artemis while strengthening China’s position as an alternative leader. This dynamic contributes to the emergence of a more fragmented and competitive space order.
Strategic Leverage for China
The potential fragmentation of the Artemis coalition would create multiple avenues of strategic leverage for China. The first of these is normative. If Artemis fails to maintain cohesion, its ability to establish widely accepted norms will be weakened. This creates space for alternative frameworks to gain traction. As the Secure World Foundation has emphasised, norm-setting is a critical dimension of space governance, shaping behaviour even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms.
A second avenue is coalition-building. China can position itself as a more flexible partner, offering participation without the same level of political alignment required by U.S.-led initiatives. This may be particularly appealing to states in the Global South seeking to expand their space capabilities while maintaining strategic autonomy. The third, and perhaps most significant, source of leverage lies in infrastructure. Control over key elements of the space ecosystem, lunar bases, communication networks, and navigation systems can create long-term dependencies. As RAND research on space infrastructure highlights, early movers have a disproportionate ability to shape the operational environment and set technical standards. Taken together, these factors suggest that China’s advantage does not depend on surpassing the United States in every dimension. It depends on exploiting gaps in cohesion and offering credible alternatives.
Implications for the Future of Artemis
The future of the Artemis Accords will hinge on the United States’ ability to manage internal tensions while maintaining external credibility. This is not simply a question of leadership, but of balance. First, there is a need to reconcile technological leadership with meaningful inclusion. Partners must see tangible benefits from participation, whether in the form of industrial opportunities, access to technology, or strategic influence. Without this, the incentive to remain within the framework may weaken over time.
Second, the issue of resource governance requires greater clarity. The current ambiguity may be manageable in the short term, but it risks becoming a source of contention as lunar activities expand. Developing a more widely accepted framework, whether through Artemis or parallel mechanisms, will be essential.
Third, Artemis must navigate the broader strategic competition context. Positioning the Accords as an exclusive bloc risk reinforcing the very fragmentation it seeks to avoid. A more flexible and inclusive approach may be necessary to maintain relevance.
Conclusion
The Artemis Accords represent one of the most ambitious attempts to shape the future of space governance. They have succeeded in building a broad coalition and establishing a set of guiding principles. Yet their long-term success will depend not on the number of signatories, but on the strength and cohesion of the relationships they embody. As tensions within the coalition evolve, the risk is not sudden failure but gradual dilution. In such a scenario, China, supported by Russia, stands to gain strategic ground, not necessarily by overtaking the United States technologically, but by offering an alternative framework that appears more adaptable and inclusive.
The contest for space is no longer defined solely by rockets and payloads. It is a contest over rules, partnerships, and the ability to sustain collective action in an increasingly competitive environment. In this contest, cohesion is not a peripheral concern and is the centre of gravity.
This article draws on open-source reporting and should be read as an analytical interpretation rather than a definitive operational account.
Muhammad Waqas Haider is a Research Fellow at London Dialogue
Muhammad Waqas Haider
Related posts
The Maritime Blockade and the Strategic Calculus of the U.S., Iran, and Israel Toward a Renewed Armed Confrontation
Understanding Asim Munir’s Doctrine: Regime Security in Place of a National Goal
The Data Dilemma: Navigating the AI Systems Matrix
The Anatomy of a Shortfall: Europe’s Nine Capability Areas and the Lessons for Pakistan
From Quiet Diplomacy to Attempted Maritime Security Governance: Oman’s Role and Limits in the 2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis
Anatomy of Asymmetry: How a Weaker State Converts Vulnerability into Leverage
Integration for Stability: The SDF’s Dissolution and Syria’s Security Order
The Western Flank Unravelled: Cross-Border Militancy, TTP Resurgence, and Afghan Taliban Governance
The Time of Guards Tank Divisions is Gone, or Maybe It is Not?
Re-pricing Israel’s Corridor: The Mecca Alliance and IMEC
The SCO at 25: From Regional Security Mechanism to Platform for a Multipolar Eurasia
Imran Khan: The Last Hope of a Nation
