Can Middle Powers Shape the Future Global Order?

At Fudan University, a close friend wrote his doctoral thesis on middle powers and their role in a changing global order. At the time, the argument felt intellectually compelling yet somewhat theoretical. Over the last few years, however, I have returned to those conversations. As countries such as Pakistan, Türkiye, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Indonesia gain greater diplomatic space in a multipolar world, his argument appears more relevant than ever: the future may not belong entirely to the superpowers alone.

For a long time, the United States set the tempo of international politics, security, and economics, and the rest of the world played along. That era is not quite over, but it is visibly ending. China has risen. Russia has reasserted itself. Wars are being fought in Europe and the Middle East. Traditional international institutions are haemorrhaging credibility. And in this noisier, more contested world, the states that fall between the great powers are stepping forward.

The emerging international order is neither neatly bipolar nor wholly multipolar. It is what Amitav Acharya has described as a ‘Multiplex World’, one in which power is distributed among multiple actors, regions, and institutions rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. In this environment, middle powers are finding room. Not because they command the largest armies or the most expansive economies, but because they can mediate, connect regions, and retain the flexibility that the great powers, locked in structural confrontation, have largely forfeited.

Türkiye is the clearest illustration. By virtue of its geography, it sustains relations across Asia and Europe simultaneously. It is a NATO member that maintains working ties with Russia. It supplies drones to Ukraine while keeping diplomatic channels open with Moscow. It was Ankara, not Washington or Brussels, that brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative when the great powers could not. Türkiye gets things done because it knows how to manoeuvre.

Pakistan occupies a distinctive position among middle powers, carrying both important opportunities and structural challenges. Geographically, it sits at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia, China, and the Middle East, lending it natural relevance across multiple regional systems. Initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, engagement within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework, and broader connectivity visions all reflect Pakistan’s effort to translate its geography into constructive influence. Its foreign policy has long reflected a pragmatic balancing logic, engaging major powers in different periods while seeking to protect core national interests.

More recently, Pakistan has signalled a more active diplomatic role, including constructive facilitation efforts during the United States-Iran crisis. This engagement underscores its potential as a bridge-builder rather than merely a participant in great-power rivalries. The critical next step lies in strengthening Pakistan’s economic base and institutional capacity, so that its strategic location becomes a genuine platform for autonomous influence and sustained diplomatic leadership rather than a structural asset that remains underutilised.

Saudi Arabia offers a parallel story. For decades, it operated largely as a security client of the United States. That relationship endures, but it has been rebalanced. Under Vision 2030, the Kingdom is pursuing its own agenda, diversifying its economy and broadening its alliances. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement brokered by China in 2023 sent a clear signal: deals of historic significance no longer require American mediation. Alternative centres of diplomatic gravity now exist, and they work.

Indonesia represents a quieter, more institutional version of middle-power activism. As the driving force behind ASEAN and the anchor of Southeast Asian regionalism, it has consistently refused to choose sides. It cultivates relations with both the United States and China on the pragmatic recognition that its survival and prosperity depend on remaining relevant to both. This posture echoes the Bandung spirit of the 1950s, when newly independent states across Asia and Africa asserted that sovereignty matters and that the Global South possesses its own voice in world affairs. That spirit is alive, and its relevance is growing.

Brazil rounds out this grouping. As the largest state in Latin America and a central force in regional integration through MERCOSUR, it engages actively in multilateral forums, including BRICS and the United Nations. Its diplomatic identity is shaped by a commitment to dialogue, cooperation, and non-intervention, which positions it as a credible interlocutor between the Global South and the major powers without sacrificing its independence.

The great powers, meanwhile, have become increasingly poor advertisements for their own dominance. The United States is burdened by internal divisions and overextended across too many commitments. China plays a cautious, restrained role rather than stepping forward as an active crisis mediator. Russia has isolated itself through its conduct in Ukraine. Europe remains fragmented. When the powerful are constrained, space for middle powers expands naturally. They become the mediators, the bridges, and the architects of alternative forums. BRICS, the SCO, the G20, and ASEAN each reflect a world that has grown tired of waiting for the West to resolve its problems.

It would be dishonest, however, to present this picture without its contradictions. Most of these middle powers face serious challenges at home. The economies of Türkiye and Pakistan have been under severe pressure. Saudi Arabia’s modernisation project remains highly centralised. Indonesia confronts environmental degradation and developmental inequality. Economic interdependence, technological change, and security considerations continue to constrain their choices. These tensions illustrate how difficult it is to sustain strategic flexibility while responding simultaneously to both opportunity and constraint.

Yet this century rewards different capacities from the last. Military power still matters, but so do connectivity, mediation, trade, technological adaptation, and the ability to build coalitions across rival camps. Middle powers, by disposition and necessity, tend to be more adept at these tasks. They know how to balance, and they know how to speak to competing sides. Compromise is not a concession for them; it is a long-practised skill.

Much of the Global South was colonised, repeatedly intervened upon, and structurally marginalised. Today, these states are not merely seeking influence within an inherited international system; they are demanding a seat at a table from which they were historically excluded. That impulse is real, it is deeply rooted, and it is not going away.

I believe middle powers will remain relevant precisely because of their demonstrated capacity to shape international outcomes in meaningful ways. Even without the commanding resources of the great powers, they can influence events through diplomacy, alliance-building, and active participation in multilateral institutions. In an increasingly interdependent world, middle powers are not merely followers of global politics. They are indispensable actors, helping to maintain balance, sustain dialogue, and build the architecture of a more cooperative international order.

Dr Gulshan Rafiq serves as a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue.