Publications
Beyond Government Formation: How Political Deadlock Is Weakening the Kurdistan Region
Binar Faeq Karim
Analysis Series
Analysis/0050/July/2026/London-Dialogue. 23 July 2026
Introduction
Nearly two years after the October 2024 election in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, the region has yet to form a new government. Parliament has convened only once, its leadership remains unelected, and the previous cabinet continues in a caretaker capacity. The deadlock reflects competing interpretations of electoral legitimacy: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) claims the right to lead as the largest individual party. At the same time, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)–New Generation alliance argues that its combined parliamentary package should determine government leadership. This exposes a structural weakness in the Kurdistan region’s political system: elections distribute seats, but there is no accepted mechanism for deciding whether the largest party or the largest post-election bloc should form the government. As these competing claims are negotiated outside parliament, institutions remain paralysed, and the region’s ability to act collectively is weakened. The region is undergoing constant political instability that is affecting its security situation as well. The structural political void, which is giving a basis for the competing interpretation after the elections, is a symbol of the low participatory political acumen among the political leadership in the Kurdistan region. It also highlights the fact that the region is experiencing internal political division; it is eroding the place for permanent anchoring of political stability.
Competing Claims to Electoral Legitimacy
The October 2024 parliamentary election widened the electoral gap between the Kurdistan region’s two dominant parties. The KDP emerged as the largest party with 39 seats, while the PUK secured 23, leaving it 16 seats behind. This result gave the KDP a stronger electoral basis for claiming the right to form and lead the next government. The PUK initially approached government formation through the Kurdistan region’s traditional system of negotiated power-sharing. Although the region has historically been governed through an agreement between the KDP and PUK, the PUK’s declining parliamentary representation has gradually weakened its position within that arrangement.
To strengthen its negotiating position, the PUK allied with the New Generation Movement, one of Kurdistan’s opposition parties. The two parties identified the “restoration of the balance of political power in the Kurdistan Region” as one of their objectives. New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid also stated that the alliance had agreed that the next prime minister should come from their block. The alliance has therefore allowed the PUK to combine its traditional demand for political balance with a new claim based on the newly formed alliance’s parliamentary strength. While the KDP argues that the largest individual party should lead the government, the PUK–New Generation alliance maintains that its combined representation should give it a decisive role in determining the premiership.
The deadlock is therefore not simply a disagreement over senior positions at this stage; it reflects competing interpretations of electoral legitimacy and the absence of an agreed mechanism for deciding whether the largest party or the largest post-election bloc should form and lead the government.
When Party Deals Override Parliament
In the meantime, the prolonged government-formation deadlock has prevented the Kurdistan Parliament from resuming its normal legislative and oversight mandate. Parliament convened the first session of its sixth term on 2 December 2024, when newly elected members took their oaths and formally assumed office. The session then moved to the nomination of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and Secretary. However, it was adjourned after failing to meet the required legal quorum, and the leadership positions remained unfilled. This was not merely a procedural delay. Parliament did not subsequently begin regular legislative work and, according to later reporting, had convened only once since the October 2024 election. The inability to elect its leadership has therefore prevented the institution from organising its work, establishing normal parliamentary activity and exercising sustained oversight of the executive.
The paralysis demonstrates how heavily the functioning of parliament depends on prior political agreement between the KDP and PUK. Although voters elected a new legislature, the parties have continued to negotiate the distribution of political authority outside parliament. Without a wider settlement between them, the elected institution has been unable to complete even its initial organisational process. This reveals a wider imbalance between political parties and state institutions in the Kurdistan region. Elections determine how many seats each party holds, but they do not independently determine how authority is distributed. Instead, these processes remain dependent on negotiations between the two dominant parties. Parliament has consequently been unable to become the principal arena in which political disagreements are debated and resolved because its own operation depends on an agreement reached outside it. The continued rule of the caretaker government further demonstrates the consequences of this dependence. Nearly two years after the election, the political process required to establish a successor administration remains stalled. Without regular parliamentary activity, legislative scrutiny and political accountability have also been constrained.
Therefore, the traditional power-sharing system may have helped manage competition between the KDP and PUK, but the current crisis reveals its institutional cost. When the two parties cannot agree, the dispute extends beyond coalition negotiations and obstructs the work of elected institutions.
Political Fragmentation Weakens the Kurdistan Region
The costs of the government-formation deadlock extend beyond parliamentary paralysis. Divisions between the KDP and PUK have long affected the Kurdistan Region’s representation in Baghdad. Still, the absence of a renewed regional government has prolonged this fragmentation and prevented the emergence of a common political framework for addressing federal and regional challenges.
The dispute over Iraq’s presidency illustrates this longer pattern. In the three most recent presidential selection processes, in 2018, 2022 and 2026, the KDP and PUK failed to agree on a single Kurdish candidate and instead supported competing nominees. This recurring division is significant because the presidency has traditionally been allocated to a Kurdish candidate and once formed part of a broader political understanding between the two parties.
It is important to note that the current regional deadlock did not create this rivalry. However, the parties’ simultaneous inability to agree on either the regional cabinet or a common presidential candidate demonstrates the absence of an effective mechanism for coordinating Kurdish positions. Federal political actors have therefore been presented with competing candidates and separate party demands rather than a unified regional position. The deadlock has become more costly as the Kurdistan region faces sustained security threats. Since 28 February 2026, more than 800 drone and missile attacks have killed 20 people, wounded 123 and damaged civilian infrastructure, according to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) figures. The continued political division has made it harder for the region to present a unified response.
International partners have also repeatedly raised government formation in meetings with Kurdish leaders. This does not prove that the region has lost international credibility, but it indicates concern that prolonged paralysis may undermine its stability and reliability as a political partner. The deadlock has therefore done more than delay government formation. It has deepened existing political fragmentation, weakened the Kurdistan region’s collective position in Baghdad and made coordinated responses to regional and security pressures more difficult.
Conclusion
The crisis has exposed a deeper weakness in the Kurdistan region’s political system: elections determine parliamentary representation, but agreements between the KDP and PUK still determine whether institutions can function. A new power-sharing deal may end the immediate deadlock, but it will not resolve this structural problem. Unless electoral results can be translated into functioning institutions through a clearer and more reliable process, future disagreements between the dominant parties are likely to produce the same paralysis. The challenge is therefore not just to form a government but to prevent party disputes from once again suspending parliament, weakening accountability and limiting the Kurdistan region’s ability to act collectively.
Binar Faeq Karim
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